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Summary  findings
Certain  Thai  policies  have  facilitated  economic  surplus.  To  some  extent.  the  role  of that  surplus  before
development  in Thailand:  1975  should  not  be underestimated.  But the  government-
*  Raising  agricultural  productivity  even  during  the  based  flow  of capital  from  agriculture  (measured  as a
early  period  of import  substitution.  percentage  of GDP)  was  less than  6 percent  in the  1960s
•  The  relatively  equal  distribution  of land.  and  early  I 970s  (except  for  three  years),  and  the  market-
*  Decentralized  industrial  growth.  based  flow  was  only  3 percent  of GDP  in 1 971.  2.5
*  The  labor-intensive  export  orientation  of both  rural  percent  in  981,  and  1.9  percent  in  1991  (rmeasured  as
and  urban  industries.  deposits  minus  cormmercial  bank  lending).
* Generally  open, merit-based  access  to education.  So capital flows  from agriculture  have not been as
Yamada  studies  capital  flows  between  Thailand's  large as is typically  assumed.  Since the  1970s,  the
agriculture  and  noragriculture  sectors,  focusing  government  has adopted  an  export-oriented  policy
especially  on  government  policy  for  agriculture,  which  emphasizing  labor-intensive  light  industry,  and
shapes  government-based  flows.  He  measures  investments  to promote  labor-intensive  industries  in rural
government-  and  market-based  flows  of both  the  areas  has created  jobs for  rurai  people.  With  a fair  level
agriculture  sector  and  agricultural  regions.  of investment  in rural  areas,  the  environmnent  in rural
Until  the  1960s,  Thailand's  economy  depended  heavily  areas  Is not  drastically  worse  than  that  in urban  areas
on agriculture  and  most  of  the workforce  was  (unlike  Latin  Anmerican and African  countiies),  and
agric¢ultural.  Since the  1960s,  Thailand  has promoted  migration  to urban  areas  has been  limited  in Thailand.
industry.  Between  1961  and  1991,  agriculture  continued  The government-based  inflow  (government  credit  for,
to grow  but  because  nonagriculture  sectors  grew  even  and  investment  in,  agriculture)  was significantly  greater
faster,  agriculture's  share  of GDP  fell from  37  percent  to  for  large farms  areas  than  ior  srnall-farm  areas.  This
13 percent.  But agriculture  still  employs  the  majority  of  might  be attributable  less to the  political  pover  of large-
the  labor  force  and still  receives  the  third  largest  budget  farm  owners  than  to  -ndustrialization  in Thailand's
allocations  (after  education  and  national  defense).  central  region.
Many  believe  thar  Thai  development  was made
possible  by capital  accumulation  based  on an  agricultural
This  paper  -a  product  of  the  Development  Research  Group  - is part  of  a larger  effort  in the  gronp  to  study  rural
development.  Copies  of  the paper  are available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
Please  contact  Emily  Khine,  room  MC3-341,  telephone  202-473-7471.  fax  202-522-3518,  Internet  address
ekhine@worldbank.org.  April  1998.  (35  pages)
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[1.  Introduction
The objective of this  paper  is to study  capital  flow between  the  agriculture
and  non-agriculture  sectors  in  Thailand.  This  paper  focuses  particularly  on
government  policy for the agriculture  sector, which is the main factor determining
government-base  flows. The paper  measures  the size of the  flows both sectors and
regions. Market-base  flow is also examined.
Thailand  was  an  agricultural  country  until  the  1960s. Its  GDP depended
heavily  on the  agriculture  sector  (37% of GDP was produced  in  the  agriculture
sector in 1961) and the majority of the labor force worked in the sector (more than
80% of the labor force worked in the sector in that  year). Thailand  has,  however,
been  promoting  industrialization,  especially  since  the  1960s. The  share  of the
agriculture  sector in 1991 GDP had fallen to 13%. Nevertheless,  the importance  of
the sector still continues to be important  in terms of the structure  of the labor force
(60% of  the  labor  force  worked  in  the  sector  in  1991). In  studying  the  Thai
development  experience,  it is important  to examine Thailand's  agriculture  policy,
especially emphasizing  capital  flows from the agriculture  sector.
This  paper  comprises  seven  sections.  The  next  section,  Section  Two
overviews  the  economic development  of Thailand  and  describes  trade  policy and
agriculture  policy. The section  aims at describing  the  role of both policies in  the
country's  development and industrialization.
Section  Three  looks at  capital  outflow from the  agriculture  sector  since
1960, referring  to  previously  published  research  (Siamwalla  and  Setboonsarng
1991,  and,  Siamwalla,  Setboonsarng  and  Patamasiriwat  1994).  The  outflow
2described in this  section is government-base  flow, direct and  indirect. This section
explains government  tax policy and price policy for the sector.
Section  Four  focuses on  market-based  flow through  commercial  banks.
The sizes of both  flows (government-base  and  market-base)  are  compared  in this
section.
Section  Five  studies  capital  flows from/to  agriculture  areas  adopting  a
regional approach. This section divides Thailand  into three  areas: agriculture  area,
non-agricultural  area  and  mixed  area.  Government-base  outflows  from  the
agriculture  area in  1961,  1971,  1981 and  1991 are  compared  in  size with  the
outflows from the agriculture  sector described in the previous  section.
Section  Six  seeks to divide the  agriculture  area  into small-farm  area  and
large-farm  area.  It  compares the  size of inter-sectoral  flows from/to both  areas  to
examine the effect of land ownership.
Section  Seven  is the conclusion. The present  paper is original in adopting  a
regional  approach, which researchers  to date have not adopted. Section 4, 5 and 6
are the key parts  of this  paper.
2 . Overview  of the  Economy
Before going on to quantitative  analysis  of capital  transfer  from  the  Thai
agriculture  sector,  an  overview of recent  economic development  and  policies  in
Thailand is given.
32.1 Economic  growth
The Thai economy has grown at the fairly high rate  in almost all years  since
1960. GDP growth rate,  as shown in Figure  1, was negative in 1957, due to the low
level  of  rice  production.  However,  in  every  year  of  the  1960s,  economic
performance  was  good  because  of  circumstances  favorable  to  agriculture,
expansion  of  farm  land  and  development  of  irrigation  facilities.  Military
expenditure  related  to the  Vietnam  War was another  factor benefiting  the  Thai
economy.
Figure  I  GDP  growth rate
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The  1970s may  be  divided  into  two  parts.  In  the  early  1970s,  Thailand
suffered from inflation caused by the oil crisis in 1973. The inflation  rate  soared to
the highest  rate  ever, as  a result  of the four-fold increase  in the price of oil. The
Thai economy experienced  slightly  slower growth, with  growth rates  of less than
5% in 1974 and  1975.  The late  1970s, however, saw better  economic performance,
thanks  to  high  prices for agriculture  products  in  the  interational  market.  The
4Thai  government  enjoyed  huge  revenues  from  rice  exports.  Thailand  enjoyed
nearly  double-digit  growth  in  its  GDP  in these  years.
The  1980s also  fall  into  two periods:  poor  economic  performance  in the  early
years  and  better  performance  in  the  latter  part  of the  decade.  The  worldwide
recession  and  resulting  protectionism  of the  early  1980s slowed  the  growth  of Thai
exports  and  held  economic  growth  down.  By contrast,  the  Thai  economy  in the  late
of 1980s  grew  rapidly,  at  double-digit  rates,  the  highest  for  30  years.  This  rapid
growth  was  led by FDI  (Foreign  Direct  Investment),  mainly  by Japanese  investors,
who  were  prompted  to  relocate  their  factories  because  of the  appreciation  of the
yen.
In the  1990s,  up  to 1995, the  Thai  economy  continued  to grow  at  a rapid  pace,
thanks  to  FDI,  not  only  from  Japan  but  also  from  East  Asian  NIES  (Newly
Industrialized  Economies).  Manufacturing  continued  to  lead  GDP  growth,
accounting  for the  major  portion  of GDP  (28% in  1992) .
2.2  Trade  policy
Trade  policy  in  Thailand  since  1960  falls  into  three  periods.  In  the  1960s,
Thailand  relied  on  natural  resources  and  agricultural  exports  for  its  export
earning.  The  overall  level  of  effective  protection  for  industry  was  modest  by
developing  country  standards.  In  the  1970s,  Thailand,  pursuing  the  import-
substitution  strategies  favored  by  many  other  developing  countries,  raised  tariffs
on  consumer  goods.  Capital  and  intermediate  goods  continued  to  be  imported  at
low duty  rates,  contributing  to an increase  in effective  protection  to value  added  in
import-substituting  industries  and  to  declines  in  effective  protection  for
5agricultural  and other traditional  exports. In  1981, Thailand's  trade  policy shifted
explicitly  in  the  direction  of export  promotion  (World Bank  1993). Remaining
export  taxes  were  reduced,  and  the  baht  was  devalued.  The  government  also
began to reduce protection  of local industries  and  to lower tariffs.  The maximum
duty rate was reduced from 100 to 60 percent.
2.3 Agricultural  Policy
Agricultural  GDP grew by about  12.3 times  in the 30 years,  1961-1991, but
non-agriculture  sectors  registered  an  even  more  substantial  increase,  one  of
almost  55.9  times,  during  the  same  period.  The  contribution  of  agricultural
production to overall national  GDP fell from 39.2% in 1961 to 12.4% in 1991.
However, the  agriculture  sector  continues  to be of essential  importance  in
that  the majority of the labor force still works in the agriculture  sector. Agriculture
has  been  the  third-largest  recipient  of national  government  budget  allocations,
after  education  and  national  defense, since  1961.  The share  of the agricultural
budget  in the total  national  budget  varied  between  7.4% and  more than  10%, as
shown in Table  1, depending  on the  agricultural  policies in force. During  the last
three  decades, budget  allocation  to subsector  has not  varied greatly.  About 40 to
60% of the agricultural  budget was allocated  to infrastructure  development,  12 to
more than  16% to extension  and technological transfer,  6% to 8% to research  and
development,  more than  8% to 14% for resources  procurement,  and the remainder
to  general  administration.  Since  the  share  of the  agricultural  budget  in  the
national  budget has undergone  no substantial  change, the average  annual  growth
rates  of the two budgets  are rather  similar  for the past  three  decades, the former
being about 15.2% per  annum and the latter  an average  of 14.5%.
6Table 1  Budget Allocations to the Agriculture  Sector
(budget: mill'on Baht)
Year  National  Budget  Budget for  Percentage  of Budget
Agriculture  accounted for by
Agriculture  (%)
1961  6,660  535  8.0
1967  18,480  1,925  10.4
1972  29,000  2,778  9.6
1977  68,570  6,869  10.0
1982  161,000  13,894  8.6
1987  227,500  16,773  7.4
1992  460,400  46,350  10.1
Annual  (14.5%)  (15.2%)
growth rate
Source: Office of Agriculture  Economics, MOAC
Government  policy  for  exports  of  agricultural  products  may  be  better
understood  through  a historical  study of export policy for rice, the key commodity
for Thai agriculture,  as both  a cash crop and a food crop. The government  had four
direct  and  indirect  taxes  for  exports:  rice  premium2,  export  duty,  quota  and
reserve  requirement,  before  1986.  Until  1965,  revenue  from  the  premium
contributed  significantly  to the budget,  around  10%. Because  of its  importance  in
the budget, the premium  rate  could not be varied to stabilize  domestic prices. But
as the importance  of the  premium  as a source of revenue  declined after  1965, its
use  as  a  domestic  price  stabilizer  increased.  As  export  duty  changes  always
required  the  approval  of Parliament,  the  rice premium  was  the  main  means  of
government  intervention  as far as rice was concerned.
In  1975, government  policy shifted  away  from the  pro-consumer  slant  of
2 The rice premium  was charged on rice exports in the years 1950-1986.  It was a fixed  fee not
depending  on the grade or quality of the rice.
7previous  years.  The Government  began to establish  higher  support  prices to  help
farmers  (Siamwalla  1991). The motivation  for these  programs  was  the desire  to
divert  resources  originating  from rice export taxes  to the  millers.  who wielded a
considerable  influence  over  individual  members  of Parliament,  as  financiers  of
political campaigns  and as controllers  of important  blocs of votes.
In  1983,  after  a  particularly  costly  support  program,  the  Government
substantially  reduced the  policy bias  favoring the  agriculture  sector, and  made  a
serious  attempt  to liberalize  the  rice trade.  Various export  taxes  were  gradually
dismantled,  and in January  1986, for the first  time since the end of World War II,
Thailand's  rice exports  were freed of all restrictions.
3.  Government-base  Outflow  from the  Agriculture  Sector
Capital  transfer  from agriculture  takes  several  forms. In this  study,  these
forms are divided into two flows, "government-base  flow" and  "market-base  flow".
The former  is also subdivided,  into  direct  and  indirect  transfer.  Direct  transfer
takes  such forms as government  taxes,  government  investment  and  agricultural
credit  provided by government  banks.  Indirect  transfer,  on the  other hand,  is the
result  of price policy, trade  policy (overvaluation  of currency  is one form observed
in  import-substitution  trade  policy) and  product-specific  intervention  vis-a-vis
producers,  as  shown  in  Figure  2.  This  section  focuses  on  government-base
transfer.  Market-base  transfer  is dealt with in the next section.
8Figure  2  Classification of Transfers
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Both  direct  and  indirect  measures  adopted  in Thailand  are  explained  in the
following.
Direct  transfer
*Government  Tax:  As  explained  in  the  preceding  section,  several  taxes  were
imposed  on  rice  exports,  such  as the  premium  or export  duty.  Two taxes  were
also  imposed  on rubber  exports:  a duty  entirely  for general  revenue  and  a small
levy to finance  a rubber-replanting  program.  A duty  on rubber  is still  levied  at  a
9progressive  rate,  so that  when  the  world rubber  price  increases,  the  tax  rate
rises  according to a preset  schedule.  For exports  of other  agricultural  products,
the  Thai  Government  has  not  imposed  explicit  taxes,  although  quantitative
restrictions  were  imposed on the  export of certain  products,  such as maize. In
addition  to  taxes  on  exports,  the  government  imposes  taxes  on  imports  of
agricultural  products,  which  means  transfer  within  the non-agriculture  sector,
as the importer,  the  consumer in turn,  pay taxes to the Government.  This study
does not address  such transfer.
*Agricultural  credit:  The Thai Government  has  provided concessional loans  or
financing quotas  for the agriculture  sector by means of the following three  modes,
which are, in effect, subsidization  of credit:
-The BAAC (The Bank for Agriculture  and Agriculture  Cooperatives)3 has opted
for average-cost pricing  rather  than  marginal-cost  pricing  in its  setting  of its
interest  rates  to be charged to farmers;
-Commercial  banks  are  required  to  lend  a  percentage,  set  at  14%, of their
deposits to the agricultural  sector; and
-Since 1987, the government  has introduced  a paddy  mortgage scheme involving
highly subsidized  loans to enable  farmers to store their  paddy till later  in the
marketing  season.
These  policies have  together  meant  a subsidy  to the  agricultural  sector of the
order of 1 billion Baht  (US$ 40 million) in 1987, that  is, almost  1% of the value-
added  in  the  agricultural  sector  (Siamwalla  1993). Of the  total  subsidy,  the
greatest  share  (about three-quarters)  is provided through  BAAC.
3  BAAC was established  in 1966, with equity of the Thai Government.  By the end of 1995, a total of
4.65 million farming families, 82.3% of all farm families throughout  the country, had  received credit
from BAAC. It has 494 branches  throughout  Thailand.
I  0*Government  Investment  in  Agriculture:  The  largest  impact  of  government
action  affecting  agricultural  production  was  felt  through  its  decisions  on
irrigation  investment.  With  Thailand  a  net  exporter  of rice,  the  government
certainly  had little  incentive  to attain  self-sufficiency, unlike  Indonesia  and the
Philippines.  Since changes in the world rice price have some impact on the pace
of investment,  investment  in irrigation  fell in 1969-1971 and in 1982-1985, when
rice prices were very  low. The Rural  Development  Program  is another  form of
government  investment  in the agriculture  sector. Of the program's  1993 total  of
52 billion Baht,  16 billion was allocated to the agriculture  sector. Rural roads are
to  be  considered  in  some  cases  as  investment  in  the  sector.  This  study,  in
principle, includes investment  in roads as inflow to the sector.
Indirect  Transfer
SPrice  policy: The most powerful  means  applied to agricultural  in the past  have
been  the various  border  measures,  applied  mostly to agricultural  exports,  but
also  to  agricultural  imports.  Figure  3  shows  the  effects  of  price  policy
intervention  for selected  agricultural  products.  The peak  years  for heavy  anti-
agricultural  bias were  the late  1970s and the  early  1980s. Starting  from about
1982 onwards, intervention  with  regard  to export  items  steadily  declined, with
maize exports being completely liberalized at the end of 1981, all taxation  of rice
exports was removed in  1986, and taxes on rubber  were gradually  reduced,  and
temporarily  removed  altogether  in  1989.  However,  there  was  increased
protection of import items (cotton, soybean, palm oil) in the mid-  1980s.
I  1FIigure :3
Effect of [}irect  Intervention  on D)omestic Relative  Prices  of Selected  Plroduct
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Source:  Siamwalla,  Setboonsarg  and Patamasiriwat (1993)
*Trade  Policy; The Thailand  of the early  1980 was a country adopting  a policy of
industrial  protection. The government  had  a sizable macro-economic imbalance
and  decided  to  deal  with  that  imbalance,  not  by  devaluation,  but  by
unsustainable  borrowing  from abroad.  In  other  words, the  currency  was over-
valued,  which was, in effect, an additional  implicit tax  on exports.  In the early
1980s, it was  of the  order  of about  10 -15% (Siamwalla  1993). These  implicit
taxes  combined  added  up  to  a  sizable  amount  and  exceeded,  in  that  period,
direct  central  government  taxes  on agricultural  exports.  Since  1986, however,
export of rice has been free of any type of restriction.
Table  2  shows  capital  outflow  from  the  agriculture  sector  to  the  non-
agriculture  sector from 1960 to 1989. Figures  in this table  are deflated by the GDP
of the year in question to compare the sizes for the different years.  Taxes affecting
the agriculture  sector (T/GDP) were around  1% of GDP in  size in the  1960s and
1970s, declining  to 0.4% in  1982 and  thereafter.  Government  investment  in  the
1  2sector  (G/GDP), which  has  been  larger  than  tax  revenue  from  the  sector  in  all
years  except  1960 and  1961, was around  3%-4% of GDP, reflecting  policy, which
emphasized  rural  stability  for political  reasons,  against  the  background  of the
Vietnam  War  in  the  1960s and  unstable  conditions  in  Cambodia  in  the  1970s.
Therefore,  direct  transfer  (T-G/GDP) has been negative  except for the initial  two
years,  which means  net inflow to the agriculture  sector. Indirect  transfer  through
both  price  policy  and  exchange  rate  policy  was  4%-10%  of  GDP.  Total
government-base  transfer  is  as  shown  in  "Outflow/GDP"  in  Table  2.  Total
government-base  outflows in  1960-62 are  not  clear  because  of data  availability
constraints.  Total  outflow as  a  percentage  of GDP  was  relatively  high  between
1963 (7.1%) and  1969 (3.2%). In  1970, the  ratio  decreased  to 0.8% and  remained
low  until  1972 due  to  relatively  small  price  intervention  for  rice  and  larger
subsidies  for  sugar.  However,  rice  price  intervention  was  most  serious  during
1973-75, and  total  outflow accounted  for 6.6% in  1973 and  12.0% in  1974, the
highest  in the three  decades (1960-1990).
There  was another  reason  for this  strong  intervention.  The international
price  of rice  soared,  doubling  between  1972 and  1974. Nevertheless,  the  Thai
Government  put  off adjustment  of the domestic price under  a cheap rice program.
Consequently,  there  was  a  large  difference  between  the  two  prices,  i.e.  price
distortion.  From  1976, the  ratio  decreased  to 2% in  1980, because  of a shift  in
government  policy from one favoring the consumer to a deregulation  policy. Due to
small  price  intervention  after  1982, outflow  relative  to  GDP  become  negative,
resulting  in net inflow, until  1986. Deregulation  of trade  policy still continues, and
the budget  for agriculture  accounted for only  10% of the national  budget  in 1991
and  1992. Thus, it is estimated  that  the agriculture  sector received net inflow from
1 3the non-agriculture  sector after  1987.
The right-hand  column (Outflow/GCF-G) of Table 2 shows ratio of outflow to
non-agriculture  capital  formation,  which is calculated  as gross  capital  formation
(GCF) minus  government  investment  in agriculture  (G). Theoretically  speaking,
"private  investment  in  agriculture"  should  also  be  deducted  to  calculate  non-
agriculture  capital  formation.  However,  private  investment  in  agriculture
accounts for only a small  share  of gross capital  formation,  because the amount  of
commercial banks'  annual  net credit to agriculture  is around  1% of Gross Capital
Formation,  and only a limited portion of bank credit  is used for agriculture  capital
formation.  Therefore,  "GCF-G" is considered  as non-agriculture  capital  formation.
The percentages  were between  22% and 57% until  1975, apart  from  1970-72, but
around  10% during  1976-81. After 1982, the ratio  was negative, which meant that
capital  outflow to the agriculture  sector did not contribute  to capital formation.
1 4Table 2 Capital Outflow from Agriculture Sector
(A Percentage  of GDP and Gross Capital Formation)
Year  T/GDP  G/GDP  T-G/GDP  Outflow/GDP Outflow/GCF-G
1  960  1.6  1.4  0.2  n.a.  n.a.
61  1.8  1.8  0.0  n.a.  n.a.
62  1.2  2.0  -0.9  n.a.  n.a.
63  1.2  2.1  -0.9  7.1  45.6
64  1.6  2.4  -0.7  6.5  38.2
65  1.3  3.0  -1.7  5.5  34.2
66  1.0  3.4  -2.4  3.7  22.4
67  0.8  4.1  -3.3  5.2  27.9
68  0.8  4.7  -3.9  4.4  23.0
69  0.8  4.6  -3.8  3.2  16.3
70  0.4  4.2  -3.8  0.8  4.2
71  0.3  4.2  -3.9  1.5  7.7
72  0.3  3.8  -3.6  1.9  9.9
73  0.4  2.8  -2.4  6.6  33.5
74  1.2  2.4  -1.1  12.0  57.2
75  1.0  3.2  -2.3  7.4  37.5
76  0.7  3.5  -2.8  2.2  11.3
77  0.9  3.8  -2.9  2.7  12.0
78  0.7  3.4  -2.7  2.5  11.5
79  0.8  3.6  -2.8  2.4  10.8
80  0.7  3.8  -3.1  2.4  11.2
81  0.5  3.4  -2.9  3.3  15.3
82  0.4  3.7  -3.3  -1.3  -6.5
83  0.4  3.2  -2.7  0.0  -0.1
84  0.5  3.1  -2.6  -0.4  -1.9
85  0.5  3.0  -2.5  -0.7  -3.6
86  0.5  2.9  -2.4  -2.0  -11.0
87  0.5  2.7  -2.2  n.a.  n.a.
88  0.4  2.8  -2.4  n.a.  n.a.
89  0.4  2.9  -2.5  n.a.  n.a.
90  0.4  2.9  -2.5  n.a.  n.a.
91  0.4  3.0  -2.6  n.a.  n.a.
Note  T :Tax  revenue from the agriculture sector
G: Government investment in agriculture
GCF: Gross capital formation
Source:  Siamwalla,  Setbonsarng,  Patamasiriwat (1994)
National  Account Statistic  and Bureau of Local Affairs,
Ministry of Interior
The  following  facts  should  be  noticed  in the  above.  Firstly,  transfer  between
the  agriculture  sector  and  the  non-agriculture  sector  was outflow  from  agriculture
until  1982, but,  the  size of that  outflow  was less  than  10% apart  from  1974. In only
seven  (7) years  was the  outflow  more  than  5% of GDP,  out of the  24 years  covered.
1 5Secondly,  the  contribution  of  that  outflow  to  capital  formation  in  the  non-
agriculture  sector  was  in  the  moderate  range  10-30/9  . The  outflow  from
agriculture  contributed  less  than  20% to  gross  capital  formation  in  the  non-
agriculture  sector in almost all the years. This percentage  declined to around  10%
in the  1980s.  Thirdly,  the  percentage  of outflow was decreasing,  and  has  been
negative since 1982, which means inflow to the agriculture  sector. This tendency is
not  consistent  with  the  typical  notion  of dualism,  in  which  agriculture-sector
surplus  has  the  role  of  capital  formation  for  industry  in  the  initial  stage  of
industrialisation.  The  Thai  case  suggests  a  small  contribution  by  agriculture
surplus  (outflow) in the history of Thai industrialisation.
There were  many reasons  for the profligate  macro-economic policies of the
late-1970s  and  early-1980s.  First,  the  second  oil price  increase  and  the  ready
availability  of petrodollars  helped to finance postponement  of needed adjustment.
Second, sharp  political conflicts in Southeast  Asia in the mid-1970s led to a heavy
increase  in  Thailand's  military  expenditures,  again  financed  by  foreign  loans.
Third,  in the  early  1980s, the  decision was made to  keep the Baht  linked  to the
dollar, even though the latter  was appreciating  rapidly (Siamwalla  1994). This was
another  case  in  which  the  ready  availability  of foreign  funds  made  an  unwise
decision possible.
4.  Market-Base  Outflow
Market-base  transfer  is of two types.  One is through  commercial banks,  the
other  is direct  investment  by the agriculture  sector in the  non-agriculture  sector.
The former  could be calculated  by finding the  difference between  banks'  deposits
1 6from  the  agriculture  sector  and  banks'  lending  to  the  sector.  Unfortunately,
agriculture  sector  statistics  lack  data  on  the  commercial  banks'  deposits  and
lending  from/to  the  sector.  On the  other  hand,  data  concerning  banking  activity  in
each  region  can  be  obtained.  Therefore,  a  regional  approach  was  deemed  most
suitable  for this  study.  The  difference  between  deposits  and  lending  of commercial
banks  in the  agriculture  area  may  be considered  to  give  a general  idea  of transfer
from  the  agriculture  sector  on a  market  basis.
For  such  a regional  approach,  it is, firstly,  necessary  to classify  "agricultural
areas"  and  "non-agricultural  areas".  Thailand  had  73  provinces  in  1991,  which
were  normally  divided  into  seven  regions.  The  GRDP  (Gross  Regional  Domestic
Product)  of all  provinces  for  the  years  1961,  1971,  1981  and  1991  was  examined.
GDP  of agriculture  can  be  affected  by  the  weather.  Production  of rice  dropped  in
1977  and  1979,  but  other  years  have  essentially  the  same  production.  This  study
chooses  1961,  1971,  1981 and  1991 to represent  each  decade.  GDP of agriculture  in
those  years  was  basically  the  same  as  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  and
following.  In  terms  of either  economic  growth  or  agriculture  policy,  this  study
assumes  the  years  1961,  1971,  1981  and  1991  were  not  exceptional.  Therefore,
studying  the  figures  in  these  years  gives  a  general  picture  of the  transition  in
outflow  pattern.
The  shares  of agriculture  and  manufacturing  in the  GRDP of a province  tend
to  be  the  same  for  all  the  provinces  of  a  particular  region.  The  shares  of
agricultural  GDP  in  the  North-eastern  region's  provinces,  more  than  half  in  1961,
had  decreased  to 20%- 40% in  1991, while  manufacturing  had  increased  to  around
5% to  10% in the  same  period.  The same  tendency  can be observed  in the  Northern
1 7and Southern  regions. Though the share  of manufacturing  in the Western  region's
provinces is bigger than  in the above region provinces. agriculture's  share  is bigger
than  that  of manufacturing  in each province during  all of the years.  Therefore. the
above four regions can be classified as "agriculture  area".
The figures for the Eastern  and Central  regions show the same change as in
the  above four regions  in 1961 and  1971. However, the share  of manufacturing  in
GRP became bigger than  that  of agriculture  in 1981 in the Central  region, and  in
1991 in Eastern  region. Those two regions  may be classified as "mixed area".
The "non-agriculture  area" is defined as Bangkok  and  its five Vicinities, as
manufacturing's  share  has been bigger than  agriculture's  since 1971.
Table 3 summarises  the figures by region. It gives a clearer idea of the above
transition,  and  helps  to confirm  the  appropriateness  of classification  into  three
areas,  i.e. agriculture  area, mixed area  and non-agriculture  area.
1 8Table 3  Share  of Agriculture  and Manufacture  in GRDP by Regions  (unit: %)
Region  1961  1971  1981  1991
Pdmy  Sewnday  Pdmy  Seiday  Pimaiy  Seiday  Pimy  Sandary
Agriculture  Area
Northern  43.3  8.8  45.3  7.7  40.3  7.5  23.5  8.9
North-east  53.9  6.5  44.5  6.8  35.8  7.5  27.1  8.6
Western  36.7  7.5  41.8  8.3  32.2  13.1  22.0  19.9
Southern  47.3  6.2  36.3  7.3  37.0  7.5  35.8  5.5
Mixed Area
Central  41.4  6.5  33.1  13.1  33.0  16.7  13.0  32.4
Eastern  35.6  16.1  37.5  20.6  27.8  28.2  12.8  30.7
Non-agicu  Axea
Bangkok  and  49.3  26.2  7.5  31.7  11.1  35.4  2.4  40.3
Vicinities
Whole Kingdom  36.7  14.1  l 28.7  18.2  21.4  22.6  12.6  28.2
Source: National  Account Division, NESDB
Table 4 supports  the validity of the classification  by giving figures for labour
force by industry.  The Western and Eastern  regions are classified with the Central
region  in these  statistics.  However,  the  agricultural  labour  force accounted  for
60%-80% in the  agriculture  area,  but  for less than  50% and 2% in the mixed area
and the non-agriculture  area respectively. Thailand  is still an agricultural  country,
in  terms  of  its  labour  structure,  i.e.  60%  of  the  labour  force  works  in  the
agriculture  sector, compared to 26% in Indonesia,  45% in the Philippines  and 55%
in  Malaysia.  Bangkok,  in  which  almost  all  the  country's  manufacturing  is
concentrated,  is only exception, and accounts for most of the nation's  GDP.
1 9Table 4  Labor Force by Industry  Type  (unit: %)
Region  1961  1971  1981  1991
P&nmiy  Sexnday  Piimyi  Saudaiy  P&may  Sexndaiy  P&maiy  Semadaiy
Agriculture  Area  15.5
Northern  87.4  3.0  80.3  5.5  69.3  10.1
North-east  90.4  2.0  89.2  2.8  81.5  6.8
Southern  83.6  2.9  69.8  9.9  60.6  11.7
Mixed Area
Central  70.0  8.6  63.1  14.6  45.5  25.2
Non  ag1uicdAia
Bangkok  and  3.5  24.0  15.8  23.1  12.1  31.1  1.7  35.3
Vicinities
Whole Country  79.3  5.2  71.7  9.4  60.5  15.3
Source: Labour Force Survey, National  Statistic  Office
Note: Western  and  Eastern  region are  grouped  with  the  Central  region in these
statistics.
Table 5 shows the development  of the commercial banking  system, in terms
Table 5 shows the development  of the commercial banking  system,  in terms
of numbers  of branches  of commercial banks.  The number  of branches  was 330 in
the agriculture  area in 1971, had doubled by 1981 and tripled  by 1991. The figures
for numbers  of branches  per capita in the agriculture  area  were one-sixth of those
for the non-agriculture  area.
2 0Table 5  Number  of Commercial  Banks Branches
1971  1981  1991
Region  Numbr  Nmber  per  Nmialef  Nmlbe  per  Numberi  Nmber  per
brandi  amlirnpexms  bmwce  amilipemo  biane  anpeiamxs
Agriculture  Area  330  11.8  751  21.3  1,209  29.5
Northern  (100)  (12.4)  (244)  (25.5)  (388)  (35.7)
North-east  (77)  (5.9)  (210)  (12.5)  (356)  (18.3)
Western  (46)  (21.2)  (115)  (40.2)  (164)  (51.0)
Southern  (107)  (23.1)  (182)  (30.2)  (301)  (40.6)
Mixed Area  71  16.6  205  38.1  355  55.7
Central  (28)  (13.3)  (86)  (34.4)  (129)  (45.9)
Eastern  (43)  (19.8)  (119)  (41.4)  (226)  (63.4)
Non-agricliAxea  314  61.8  205  83.8  895  96.4
Bangkok  and  (314)  (61.8)  (86)  (83.8)  (895)  (96.4)
Vicinities
Note: Number  per capita is expressed  by number per a million persons
Source: Annual Report of Bank of Thailand,  various  years
Table 6 shows actual market-base  flow through  commercial banks.  In all the
years  covered, the  net flow (deposits  minus  lending) is positive in the agriculture
area.  This  fact  means  outflow of market-base  funds  from  the  agriculture  area.
However, the size of transfers  as a percentage  of GDP decreased  after  1971, 3.0%
in  1971, 2.5% in  1981 and  1.9% in  1991, reflecting  the  growth  of credit-worthy
industry  in the agriculture  area  after the  1980s.
2  1Table 6  Market-base  Outflow from the Agriculture  Area  (million Bahts)
Year  Deposit  Lending  Outflow  GDP ratio  (GDP  ratio  of
(%)  government-
base flow %)
1961  1,679  1,620  59  0.1  (n.a.)
1971  8,460  3,908  4,552  3.0  (1.5)
1981  69,044  50,410  18,634  2.5  (3.3)
1991  378,004  330,077  47,927  1.9  (-2.6)
Source: Annual  Report of Bank of Thailand,  various  years
Note: Figures  in parentheses  are quoted from Table 2.
The other  market-base  flow is capital  investment  by the agriculture  sector
in the non-agriculture  sector other than  through  commercial banks.  The income
survey  of farm  households  carried  out  by the  Ministry  of Agriculture  does  not
provide a breakdown  for expenditure  or investment,  so that  direct  investment  by
the agriculture  sector in the non-agriculture  sector is not clear. However, farmers'
income has always been far less than those in the non-agriculture  sector, as shown
in Table  7. This type of investment  is estimated  to be on a fairly small scale.
Table 7 Per Capita  Income in the Agriculture  and the Non-agriculture  Sectors
(Baht per capita)
Per Capita  Income in
Year  Agriculture  Sector (a)  Non-agriculture  Sector (b)  Ratio (b/a)
1961  1,002  6,212  6.2
1967  1,373  9,148  6.7
1972  1,797  10,905  6.1
1977  3,674  20,629  5.6
1982  5,743  38,357  6.7
1987  5,938  52,869  8.9
1990  7,137  85,343  12.0
Source: NESDB and Office of Agricultural  Economics, MOAC
2 2On the  assumption  that  the size of direct investment  is so small that  it may
be ignored, both flows (government-base  and market-base)  are fairly close in scale
to GDP given by Tables 2 and 6. The size of government-base  outflow in 1971 was
1.5% of GDP, while that  of market-base  flow was 3.0%, double in  size. This  fact
supports  the Teranishi  hypothesis  that  market-base  flow is large enough  in East
Asian Countries  for governments  not to be obliged to depend on government-base
transfer  for  industrialisation.  In  1981, the  size  of government-based  flow was
bigger that  of market-base,  with  Government-base  flow 3.3%, while market-base
flow was 2.5%. Both sizes, however, were not so different  as not to be comparable.
In  1991, government-base  flow was  inflow, accounting  for -2.6% of GDP, while
market-base  flow was outflow, 1.9%.
In the three  years  covered, which may be considered representative  of each
decade, market-base  flow was large enough  in size to compare  with government-
base flow, reflecting the fact that  banking system  had developed to a considerable
level in agriculture  area.  The Teranishi  hypothesis  is not invalid,  at least  in the
case of Thailand.
5.  Capital  Outflow  from the Agriculture  Areas
In this  section, the  same approach  is adopted  as in Section 4, the  regional
approach.  It  made it possible  to determine  the  size of outflow from the  sector in
Section  3 by studying  the  size of outflow of the  agriculture  area  instead  of the
agriculture  sector. With  the  regional  approach,  there  is no problem  of having  to
decide  whether  government  investment  in  schools or roads,  for example,  comes
under  investment  in the  agriculture  sector or  not.  Government  investment  and
2 3subsidies  go to regions  or local governments.  The regional  approach  avoids such
problems.
The  same  classification  as  in  the  previous  section  is  applied,  with  the
agriculture  area  considered  to  be  the  Northern,  North-eastern,  Western  and
Southern  regions.  Table  8  shows  direct  government-base  outflow  from  the
agriculture  area.
Table 8  Capital  Outflow from the Agriculture  Area  (%)
T/ GDP  G/ GDP  T-G/ GDP
...................................................  ..................................  .,.......................................  ........................................................................
1961  1.1  (1.8)  0.6  (1.8)  0.7  (0.0)
1971  0.7  (0.3)  0.9  (4.2)  -0.2  (-3.9)
1981  0.9  (0.5)  1.4  (3.4)  -0.5  (-2.9)
1991  1.1  (0.4)  1.3  (3.0)  -0.2  (-2.6)
Note:  Figures  in  parentheses  show  the  size  of  the  agriculture  sector  as
calculated  by Siamwalla  (1993).
T is tax from the agriculture  area.
G is government  investment  in the agriculture  area, including subsidies.
Source: Taxes: The Revenue Department,  Ministry  of Finance
Subsidies: Bureau  of Local Affairs, Department  of Local Administration,
Ministry  of Interior
Public Investment:  National  Account Statistics,  NESDB
Figures  in parentheses  show the  size of flow from the agriculture  sector as
calculated  in preceding  research  (Siamwalla  1993). The GDP percentage  figures
for taxes  from the  area  were  1.1%, 0.7%, 0.9% and  1.1% in  1961, 1971, 1981 and
1991, respectively.  These are  two to three  times  larger  than  the figures  given by
Siamwalla (see Table  2). This  might be the effect of industrialisation  or increased
services sector activity in the area. For example, Table 8 gives the figures for taxes
from the  manufacturing  sector or services sector in the  agriculture  area. Table  3
2 4shows GDP of the agriculture  sector was less than  one-third of total GRDP in 1991,
even in the  agriculture  area.  The fact that  the difference between two figures  has
been  becoming  bigger  in  recent  vears  suggests  the  appropriateness  of  this
assumption.
Government  investment  including  subsidies,  on the other  hand,  was 0.6%,
0.9%, 1.4% and  1.3% of total  Thai GDP in these  years.  These figures  are  smaller
than  Siamwalla's  figures  in  parentheses.  The  difference  may  have  occurred
because: 1) government  investment  in or subsidies to the ar-ea  used in this  study do
not  include  subsidies  for  agricultural  credit,  such  as  BAAC  and  the  paddy
mortgage  scheme,  and  2) Siamwalla's  figures  include  government  investment  in
roads.
Despite  the  above  differences,  total  outflow  shows  the  same  trend  as
Siamwalla's  research,  negative  (inflow) in all the years  covered, apart  from  1961.
The regional  approach also demonstrates  the small size of capital  outflow from the
agriculture  area  in  the  case of Thailand,  resulting  in  inflow to  the  agriculture
sector or area in 1971, 1981 and  1991.
6.  Capital  Outflow  from  Small-Farm  Areas  and  Large-Farm  Areas4
Adopting the regional  approach,  this  study  attempts  to measure  the size of
flows from/to small-farm  holding areas  and  large-farm  holding areas,  in  order  to
t The classification  of  "small-farm  area" and "large-farm  area"  is not typical in Thailand as Ammar
Siamwalla pointed out in the World  Bank Workshop.  Table 9 shows  that the average  size of farm is
not very different among  regions compared  to ones of other countries. However,  this study tries to
examine  influence of  farm size to the capital flows  for the comparative  purpose.
2 5examine  the  effect  of  land  ownership,  another  important  hypothesis  of  the
Teranishi  Framework.  In  this  section,  Thailand's  regions  are  divided  into  two
categories on the basis of 1992 farming land ownership  and farm size.
In 1992, the average farm holding size in the country was about 25.6 rai5 per
household.  Farms  of between  10 to 20 rai accounted  for the  highest  percentage,
28%, with  2 to  10 rai  holdings  coming next,  followed by 20 to  30 rai  holdings.
Regionally, average farm holding size is largest  in the Central  region, 31.8 rai. The
largest  category in the North is 2 to  10 rai, which accounted for 32.6% of all farms
in the region. Details of farm holding size in each region are summarised  in Table
9.
Table 9  Size of Farm  Holding in 1992  (unit: %)
Size of Farm  North-eastern  Northern  Central  Southern
less than 2 rai  1.3  2.5  2.6  1.6
2- 10 rai  15.7  32.6  17.4  23.0
10- 20 rai  29.5  26.9  22.5  32.0
20-30 rai  22.0  14.6  18.6  18.6
30- 40 rai  13.4  8.5  12.9  10.6
40- 50 rai  7.6  5.6  8.2  5.3
50-60 rai  4.2  3.7  6.3  3.3
60-70 rai  2.5  1.9  3.6  1.4
more than  70 rai  3.9  3.8  7.9  4.4
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Average size of farm (rai)  26.1  21.5  31.8  23.7
Source: Office of Agriculture  Economics, MOAC
Note: 1 rai = 0.16 hectares.
' The Rai is the traditional unit for measuring farm land. 1 rai =0.16  hectares.
2 6Table  10 shows ownership of farm land in 1992. In the whole country, 45% of
farm land belonged to those cultivating  it. with 18% belonging to "common owners"
(only a part  of land belongs to cultivators).  About 37% of farm land was farmed  by
tenant  farmers.  Land  ownership  by  region  shows  the  characteristics  shown  in
Table  10. The percentage  of "no ownership"  (cultivators  has no ownership)  in the
Central  region  is slightly  higher  than  in the  other  regions.  In  view of the  above
land ownership  distribution  and  farm size, the Central  region can be classified as
an area  with  relatively  large-sized  farms  with  a high  ratio  of land tenure,  which
means relatively  large-scale  landowners  predominate  in this  region.
Table  10  Distribution  of Land Ownership by  einin19  %
Cultivator's  Ownership  North-eastern  Northern  Central  Southern
Owns all land farmed  50.2  38.5  42.5  41.8
Owns part  of land farmed  19.7  17.1  9.0  24.6
No ownership  30.1  44.4  48.5  33.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Office of Agricultural  Economics, MOAC
Table  11 shows  direct  government-base  transfer  by area.  The  large-farm
area,  the  Central  region,  received  inflow  in  1961, while  the  small-farm  area
registered  outflow  in  the  same  year.  Taxes or public  investment  included  non-
agriculture  taxes  and investment  in all years.  Nevertheless,  the year  1961 shows
the  non-agriculture  sector  having  little  importance,  with  agricultural  GDP
accounting for the major share.  The large-farm area  received more investment,  87
Baht  per  capita,  in  1961 than  the  small-farm  area  did, 22 Baht  per  capita.  The
ratio  between  the  two areas  was  1:3.95. The ratio was similar  in 1971 and  1981.
The large-farm area  also received more investment,  297 Baht per capita, while the
small-farm  area  received only 69 Baht per capita, with the ratio,  1:4.3 in 1971. In
2 71981, the ratio  was 1:3.48. Although  the  effect of industrialisation  is to be taken
into account, public investment  in the large-farm  area was 3 to 4 times larger than
in the  small-farm  area  until  1981. In other  words,  the  large-farm  area  enjoyed
higher  priority than  the small-farm  area for government  investment.  However, by
1991 the  government  investment  gap  had  narrowed  with  the  small-farm  area
receiving more investment,  resulting  in a ratio of 1:1.32.
The reason for these differences need to be examined in detail, whether  they
were  due  to  the  political  influence  of large-farm  owners  or  to  the  degree  of
industrialisation.  Taking into account the fact that  Table  3 shows higher  GDP for
secondary  industry  in the  Central  region in all  the years  than  in  the  Northern,
North-eastern,  Western  and Southern  regions, the reason  would appear  to be the
pace of growth of industrialisation  in the large-farm  area rather  than the  political
power  of  large-farm  owners.. The  following  findings  also  support  the  above
assumption:  1) the large-farm  area  paid more tax than  the  small-farm  area  in all
the years covered, and, 2) as a consequence of tax and investment,  the small-farm
area enjoyed capital inflow after  1971, while the large-farm  area  had outflow after
1971.
2 8Table  11  Government  Tax and investment  by Regions (Baht/ person)
____  ~~1961  1971  1981  _1991
Large-farm  area
Tax  79  354  1,801  6,718
Investment  (a)  87  297  1,553  1.213
Outflow  -8  57  248  5,505
Small-farm  area
Tax  43  56  291  777
Investment  (b)  22  69  446  914
Outflow  21  -13  -155  -137
Ratio (a)/(b)  3.95  4.30  3.48  1.32
Source: Tax  The Revenue  Department,  Ministry  of Finance
The Excise Department  and The Custom Department
Subsidies  Bureau  of Local Affairs, Department  of Local Administration,
Ministry  of Interior
Public Investment  National  Account Statistics,  NESDB
Note: Investment  includes Public Investment  and  subsidies
If we look at agricultural  credit  provided by government  banks,  the large-
farm  area  received more credit  per  farmer  in the  last  three  years  selected.  The
ratio has,  however, been declining, from 1: 2.5 in  1970-72 to 1: 2.0 in 1990-92, due
to the  Thai  policy emphasising  rural  development.  In  the  case of governmental
agricultural  credit,  the  large-farm  area  has  received a  larger  amount  per  capita
than  the small-farm  area.  Further  research  is needed  to explain  the  differences.
Considering the fact that  BAAC credits  also includes credit for the food-processing
industry  and  millers,  the  author  believes  that  the  larger  amount  for the  Central
region will be attributable  to the effect of industrialisation  rather  than  because of
the political power of large farm owners.
Table 12  BAAC Agricultural  Credit by Region
(Baht per Worker in Primary  Industry)
.. 1.....................................................................................................................................................  .................................  ...............................
Large-farm  area  (a)  74.6  1,185.3  4,436.5
Small-farm area  (b)  29.7  518.7  2,234.0
Ratio  (a)/(b)  2.5  2.3  2.0
Note: Three-year  average,  centred  on the year indicated
Source:  BAAC Annual  Report (various issues)
Report of the Labour Force Survey (various issues)
2 97.  Conclusion
Within the limits imposed  by data availability, this study measured and assessed
the  size  of outflows between  sectors and  areas.  It  analysed  the  reasons  for and
background to those flows, and examined the consequences of the flows for economic
development, as far as possible. The study has, thus, highlights a number of points.
First, the study relies on previous research for measuring the size of government-
base  outflow from  the  sector.  Further  study  should  examine  and  scrutinise  the
assumptions and calculations of previous research. The second point concerns market-
base flow. This flow needs to be analysed and assessed more precisely in quantitative
terms in a later  study. Because of the data availability constraints, the present study
only deals with lending and deposits of commercial banks in the agriculture area, an
area defined in terms of GDP and labour force  composition. Direct investment from the
agriculture sector to the non-agriculture sector, which is treated  as almost negligible in
this  paper, should be counted in the future. The third  points is the question of the
relationship between market-base flow and the business cycle. A prominent  study of
capital transfer  for the Japanese  agriculture sector over seven decades showed a close
correspondence  (Teranishi  1982).  However, this  paper  had  data  constraints  for
market-base flow,  so that kind of analysis had to be abandoned. The fourth point is the
question of the reasons for the large flows  to the large-farm area, the Central region. In
order to prove or disprove the assumption that the large flow  was caused by the political
power of large-farm owners in this area, further socio-political  research will be required.
The fifth point is the influence and role of foreign capital flow, such as foreign aid and
FDI.  They are  not  studied in  this  paper.  In views of the  fact that  foreign capital
accounted for 34% of gross capital formation in the  early  1970s, the  role of foreign
capital, including ODA and FDI, should be considered for an accurate assessment of
3 0agriculture-sector surplus. The last point is the relationship between agriculture credit
and saving rate 6. The EastAsian Miracle observed high saving rates in high-performing
Asian economies. The contribution of agriculture credit to a  high saving rate is to be
examined in the later study.
Notwithstanding  the  above, it  is  believed that  this  study  measured  both
government-base and market-base capital flows  usefully and with acceptable accuracy.
The government-base flow is measured as a percentage of GDP. The ratio was less than
5-6% in the  1960s and the early 1970s, except for 1974 (12%), 1975 (7.4%)  and  1963
(7.1%).  They may be felt to be low by those who believe Thai development was made
possible by capital accumulation based on an agriculture surplus, in accordance with the
typical dualism theory. Of course, it is true that  outflow contributed to gross capital
formation in the non-agriculture sector to a certain extent,  1/5 to 1/3 before 1975. The
role of agricultural surplus in Thai industrialisation should not be under-evaluated.
On the  other hand,  market-base  capital flow from the agriculture  sector, for
which agriculture area was substituted in this study, was 3.0%  of GDP in 1971, 2.5% in
1981 and  1.9% in  1991, measured  as deposits minus  lending of commercial banks.
Although there is room for further improvement in measurement, this study measures
and  compares the  two flows, government-base and  market-base, whereas  previous
studies had  looked at  government-base flow only. Government-base flow was larger
than market-base flow in 1981, while government-base flow was smaller than market-
base flow in 1971 and 1991. Market-base transfer, recently became the main source of
outflow from agriculture, as  government-base transfer  became inflow to agriculture
'6 The author is thankful to the comment  of Peter Timmer  for this point. This  paper, however,  could
not include this point because of  time constrains.
3  1after  1982.  Teranishis  hypothesis that market-base flow is large enough in East Asian
Countries for the government not to be forced to depend on government-base transfer
for industrialisation, is valid for the case of Thailand.
This study also attempted  to examine the size of flows for the large-farm area
and the small-farm area, to establish whether any differences exist between the two
kinds of area. At least, government-base inflow (government credit for and investment
in  agriculture) has  been significantly larger  for the  "large-farm area"  than  for the
"small-farm area" (the ratio is more than 1:2 per capita basis). However, the differences
in ownership and size of farm between the "large-farm area'  and the "small-farm area",
are fairly small compared with those in certain other developing countries. This larger
inflow might be attributable  less to the political power of large-farm owners than  to
industrialisation in the Central region.
In Thailand, outflow from the agriculture sector and area, both market-base and
government-base, has not been so large as is typically assumed in the Lewis Model. Due
to the  moderate outflow from the agriculture  sector to date, the environment of the
rural  areas  is not  drastically worse than  that  in  the  urban  areas,  unlike in  Latin
American or African countries, as shown in Table 13. Moreover, migration to the urban
areas  has not  been so much of a  problem. At the  same time,  the government  has
adopted an  export-oriented policy emphasizing light industry  of the  labour-intensive
type since the mid-1970s.  There has been some investment to promote labour-intensive
industries in the rural  areas, which has created jobs for rural people. The rural areas
have, thus, received a fairly good level of investment, and migration to urban  area has
been limited in Thailand.
3 2Table  13  Development  Infrastructure  (%)
Country  Access  to Safe  Water  Availability  to Electricity
Urban  Area  Rural Area  Urban Area  Rural Area
Thailand  56  66  78  40
Indonesia  43  36  39  10
Philippines  49  54  N/A.  N/A.
Brazil  85  53  95  19
Mexico  79  51  N/A.  N/A.
Ghana  93  39  N/A.  N/A.
Kenya  61  21  N/A,  N.A.
Source: Social Indicators  of Development  1996
Dr  Ranis  mentions  a  number  of  policies as  facilitating  smooth  economic
development (Ranis  1991): (i) raising agricultural productivity even during the early
period of import-substitution, (ii) relatively equal distribution of land, (iii) decentralised
industrial  growth,  (iv) labour-intensive export orientation  of both  rural  and  urban
industries, and (v) generally open, merit-based, access to education. Thailand may be
one  of the  countries which attained  economic development by means of the  above
policies.
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